The limits between truth and post-truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy

Abstract

The post-truth is a contemporary phenomenon that has become widely analyzed from various perspectives, among them that of Philosophy. In this sense, this article presents itself as another philosophical effort to understand the tension between truth and post-truth, as well as the mechanisms that delimit them. However, we will seek from Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy to understand this question beyond what is commonly asserted, when it comes to truth and post-truth as opposites, to analyze the closeness between one and the other, both manifested in the context of language and grammar. In the philosophy of the first Wittgenstein, truth is possible from the necessary relation that it establishes with reality; however, in its second phase, the philosopher abandons the idea of ​​truth and its possible faithful support to the external and / or metaphysical world, to treat it as a kind of convention, which takes place within a language game, from a practical reality. It is at this point that we will seek to discuss in this article the extent to which truth and post-truth are confused and their possible limits are dissolved, after all, without any possibility of foundation, the problem stated is diluted, as in a philosophical therapy.